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Although some of the most important elements of a knowledge-based economy in the
coming century will be intellectual asset transactions, the current marketplace for intellectual
asset transactions is murky at best. With patent litigation costs skyrocketing, most
organizations have only recently begun licensing and cross-licensing their intellectual asset
portfolios. Because robust valuation metrics for intellectual assets have not been fully
developed, most licensing negotiations are based on rules of thumb rather than quantitative
methods, rules of thumb that can often be economically disadvantageous to either the
licensee or the licensor. With only two percent of the millions of innovations created in this
country utilized under license, billions of dollars worth of intellectual assets are
underutilized.
Economic theory might suggest that the information necessary for quantitative analysis is
too costly to acquire (i.e. difficult to obtain or not available at all), resulting in a relatively
small number of market transactions involving intellectual assets, with valuations generally
covered by rules of thumb. Different organizational behavior theories would probably
suggest that some forms of bounded rationality are responsible for the use of these rules of
thumb. The true answer probably lies somewhere in the middle of the spectrum between
those perspectives.
This article explores the nature of intellectual assets and the dynamics of intellectual
asset transactions. After examining various organizational behavior and economic
perspectives in search of an explanation for the current state of the marketplace for
intellectual asset transactions, the article concludes by proposing valuation metrics that might
better inform the negotiations surrounding an intellectual asset transaction.
© 2001 Gavin Clarkson. All rights reserved.* Olin Fellow in Law, Economics, and Business and KPMGFellow at the Harvard
Business School.
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1. See Katherine Bouton, Academic Research and Big Business: A Delicate
Balance,N . Y .T IMES, Sept. 11, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 62, 123.
2. Several of these rules of thumb are discussed in detail in Part II.B, infra.
3. Cf. John Milward, A Five-Year Journey to a Better Mousetrap,N . Y .T IMES,M a y
24, 1998, § 3, at 8 (“[O]nly 2 percent of all patents are ever licensed to major
corporations.”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
An oft-quoted rule of thumb suggests that of ten
laboratory inventions, only one will receive a patent;
only one in ten patents will be licensed by a
company, and only one in ten licenses results in
more than $25,000 per year in income
1
Although some of the most important elements of a knowledge-
based economy in the coming century will be intellectual asset
transactions, the current marketplace for these transactions is murky
at best. While patent litigation costs are skyrocketing, most
organizations have only recently begun licensing and cross-licensing
their intellectual asset portfolios. Because robust valuation metrics
for intellectual assets have not been fully developed, most licensing
negotiations are based on rules of thumb rather than quantitative
methods—rules of thumb that are often economically
disadvantageous to either the licensee or the licensor.
2 With only two
percent of the millions of innovations created in this country utilized
under license,
3 billions of dollars worth of intellectual assets are
underutilized. Such a situation leads to the obvious question . . .
why?Intellectual Asset Transactions 3
4. See Nancy T. Gallini, Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for
Licensing,7 4A M.E CON.R EV. 931 (1984); Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter,
Licensing in the Theory of Innovation,1 6R AND J. ECON. 237 (1985); Morton I. Kamien
& Yair Tauman, Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent, 101 Q.J.ECON.
471 (1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, How to License Intangible Property, 101
Q.J.ECON. 567 (1986); MichaelL. Katz &CarlShapiro, OntheLicensingofInnovations,
16 RAND J.ECON. 504 (1985).
5. See, e.g.,C . T .T AYLOR &Z . A .S ILBERSTON,T HE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM:A S TUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE (1973); Zvi Griliches, Patent
Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,2 8J .E CON.L ITERATURE 1661 (1990); Zvi
Griliches, Patents: Recent Trends and Puzzles, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 291; Zvi Griliches et al., The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive
Activity, in ECONOMICPOLICY ANDTECHNOLOGICALPERFORMANCE 97 (Partha Dasgupta
& Paul Stoneman eds., 1987); F.M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity,
and the Output of Patented Inventions,5 5A M.E CON.R EV. 1097 (1965); Jacob
Schmookler, Economic Sources of Inventive Activity,2 2J .E CON.H IST. 1 (1962).
6. See, e.g., Jerry Hausman et al., Econometric Models for Count Data with an
Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship,5 2E CONOMETRICA 909 (1984); Jean
Olson Lanjouw et al., How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses
of Patent Renewal and Application Data,4 6J .I NDUS.E CON. 405 (1998).
7. See, e.g., John Bound et al., Who Does R & D and Who Patents?, in R&D ,
PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 21 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984); Zvi Griliches, Market Value,
R & D, and Patents, in R&D ,P ATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 249 (Zvi Griliches ed.,
1984); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Patents and R and D: Is There a Lag?,2 7I NT’L ECON.
REV. 265 (1986); Ariel Pakes & Zvi Griliches, Patents and R & D at the Firm Level: A
First Look, in R&D,P ATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 55 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984).
8. See, e.g.,Z h e nD e n ge ta l . ,Science and Technology as Predictors of Stock
Performance,F IN.A NALYSTS J., May-June 1999, at 20; Zvi Griliches et al., R & D, and
Patents, and Market Value Revisited: Is There a Second (Technological Opportunity)
Factor?,1E CON.I NNOVATION &N EW TECH. 183 (1991); Bronwyn H. Hall, Innovation
and Market Value, in PRODUCTIVITY,I NNOVATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Ray
Economic theory suggests that the information necessary for
quantitative analysis is too costly to acquire (i.e., difficult to obtain or
not available at all), resulting in a relatively small number of well-
valued market transactions involving intellectual assets, with most
valuations generally covered by rules of thumb. Different
organizational behavior theories suggest that some form of bounded
rationality is responsible for the use of these rules of thumb. The true
answer probably lies somewhere between these perspectives.
Parties to intangible asset licensing negotiations need a better set
of metrics to enable them to reach successful technology licensing
agreements. Much of the available economic literature on licensing,
while theoretically sound, is neither empirically based nor instructive
on how to develop an industry-based metric for royalty rates.
4 The
literature on patents, R&D expenditures, and market value is also
informative but does not provide clear guidance for examination of
actual royalty rate provisions. Significant literature exists regarding




7 and evaluating returns from intellectual assets.
8Intellectual Asset Transactions 4
Barrell et al. eds., 2000); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from
IndustrialResearchandDevelopment,1987BROOKINGSPAPERSONECON.ACTIVITY783;
Ariel Pakes, On Patents, R & D, and the Stock Market Rate of Return,9 3J .P OL.E CON.
390 (1985); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Market Value and Patent Citations: A First Look,
NBER Working Paper No. 7741 (2000).
9. See TAYLOR &S ILBERSTON, supra note 5; Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna,
The Structure of Licensing Contracts,4 8J .I NDUS.E CON. 103 (2000); Ashish Arora,
Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical Industry,2 6R ES.P OL’Y. 391
(1997); Christian Bessy&Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing Contracts Features and
Diversity,1 8I NT’LREV.L AW&ECON. 451 (1998); Richard E. Cavesetal., The Imperfect
Market for Technology Licenses,4 5O XFORDBULL.E CON.&S TAT. 249 (1983); Stephen
A. Degnan & Corwin Horton, A Survey of Licensed Royalties, LES NOUVELLES, June
1997, at 91; Inés Macho-Stadler et al., The Role of Information in Licensing Contract
Design,2 5R ES.P OL’Y. 43 (1996); M.D. Rostoker, PTC Research Report: A Survey of
Corporate Licensing, 24 IDEA 59 (1983).
10. See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
RUSSELL L. PARR &P ATRICK H. SULLIVAN,T ECHNOLOGY LICENSING:C ORPORATE
STRATEGIES FOR MAXIMIZING VALUE (1996); GORDON V. SMITH &R USSELL L. PARR,
VALUATION OFINTELLECTUALPROPERTY ANDINTANGIBLEASSETS (3d ed. 2000); Lauren
Johnston Stiroh & Richard T. Rapp, Modern Methods for the Valuation of Intellectual
Property, in PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS 171 (PLI Pats.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 526, 1998);
RichardS.Toikka,PatentLicensingUnderCompetitiveandNon-CompetitiveConditions,
82 J. PAT.&T RADEMARKOFF.S OC'Y 279 (2000).
11. PARR &S ULLIVAN, supra note 10; SMITH&P ARR, supra note 10.
Yet, other than a small number of empirical studies,
9 little or no in-
depth examination of royalty rate calculations has been performed.
Several authors, as well as jurists, however, have suggested that a
good, industry-specific metric for use in royalty rate negotiations
would be based on the difference between the aggregate earnings
rates from companies with intellectual asset portfolios and the
aggregate earnings rates from companies without such portfolios.
10
Parr & Sullivan and Smith & Parr
11 in particular have suggested that
such a metric could be derived from the well-established financial
measure known as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, but a
specific metric has never been reduced to a workable form.
Part II of this article presents some background on the nature of
intellectual assets and the dynamics of intellectual asset transactions.
Part III examines various organizational behavior and economic
perspectives in search of possible explanations for the current state of
the marketplace for intellectual asset transactions. Part IV offers
possible improvements by proposing valuation metrics that might
better inform the negotiations surrounding an intellectual asset
transaction.
II. BACKGROUNDIntellectual Asset Transactions 5
12. Microsoft’s intellectual property and intangible assets account for almost 95% of
its market value. See GAVIN CLARKSON &L YNDA APPLEGATE,I NTELLECTUAL ASSET
VALUATION 2, 15 ( Harv. Bus. School Pub. No. 801-192, 2000).
13. LESLEY ELLEN HARRIS,D IGITALPROPERTY:C URRENCY OF THE 21ST CENTURY
51 (1998).
14. Certain countries, including the United States, have created additional areas of
specialized intellectual property protection such as photolithography masks and plant
variety patents. See 17 U.S.C § 901–914 (1994) (photoilthography masks); 7 U.S.C. §
2321–2582 (1994) (plant variety protection).
The balance sheet of a successful company occasionally includes
an entry for Intangible Assets. Given the microscopic level of study
devoted to other elements of a company’s financial statement, it is
surprising to note the scant attention given to intangible assets.
Nevertheless, the information economy includes numerous companies
whose value is almost entirely based on intangible assets.
12 More
often than not, the value of these intangible assets is not reflected
anywhere in a company’s financial statements.
Intellectual assets, a subset of intangible assets, have become one
of the most important commodities in our globally connected
economy, accounting for “more than 20 percent of world trade, or
approximately US$740 billion.”
13 Despite the importance of
intellectual asset transactions it would seem they are often the least
understood of all types of economic transactions, and perhaps the
most poorly managed. A closer look at the nature of intellectual
assets may provide a better understanding of these transactions.
A. The Nature of Intellectual Assets
Intellectual property (IP) is a primary class of intangible assets.
More specifically, it is intangible property that has some form of legal
protection. Intellectual property law identifies five major sources of
legal protection: patents, trademarks, industrial designs, confidential
information/trade secrets, and copyright.
14 In general, patents protect
inventions, such as new medicines or new processes for making
something. Trademark law protects words, names, symbols, pictures,
logos, designs, or shapes associated with a product (for instance, the
words “Coca-Cola” or “Microsoft”). Industrial designs protect the
aesthetic appearance of a product rather than its functional features.
Trade secret law protects concepts, ideas, and factual information
kept in confidence, such as customer lists or the idea for a computer
program. Copyright law, the last major area of protection, deals with
protection of ideas; however, copyright law differs from other forms
of intellectual property protection in that it protects the expression of
an idea rather than the idea itself.Intellectual Asset Transactions 6
15. See, e.g., Hausman et al., supra note 6.
16. WilliamTaylor,TheBusinessofInnovation:AnInterviewwithPaulCook,H ARV.
BUS.R EV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 96.
17. Because intangible assets and intellectual assets would both have the same
acronym, and since the concept of intellectual assets almost always includes intellectual
property, IPIA is used to refer collectively to intellectual property and intellectual assets.
18. HIROYUKI ITAMI &T HOMAS W. ROEHL,M OBILIZING INVISIBLE ASSETS 12–13
(1987).
19. Fora discussion of thetechnologist’sviewpoint, seeWilliam J. Abernathy& Kim
B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction,R ESEARCH POLICY,
Feb. 1985, at 3 and Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation:
The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established











Companies with high valuations based on intangible assets tend
to be innovative, but the study of innovation is not an exact science.
Many economists have tried to quantify innovation using patents as
surrogates.
15 One potential shortcoming of focusing on patents as a
measure of innovation, besides the fact that it ignores the other types
of intellectual property, is that patents are often valueless absent the
“know-how” that translates protected intellectual property into viable
products. Innovation increases the value of intellectual property.
Paul Cook, president of Raychem,
described this process as “the real
work—reducing the idea to practice
[is] the drudgery part of
innovation.”
16 Conceptually,
intellectual property, as the result of
creativity, might be viewed as the
invention while intellectual assets
could be viewed as the innovations
that, when combined with the
invention, become a product.
This article refers to intellectual
property and intellectual assets
collectively as “IPIA”.
17 Intellectual
capital includes IPIA as well as
other informational and intangible
assets. Whether shown on the balance sheet as intangible assets or
not, these “invisible assets are the real source of competitive power
and the key factor in corporate adaptability for three reasons: they are
hard to accumulate, they are capable of simultaneous multiple uses,
and they are both inputs and outputs of business activities.”
18
Expanding valuations beyond examining patents alone is one
major difference between the viewpoint of the economist on
innovation and that of the technologist.
19 But even the technologist’sIntellectual Asset Transactions 7
20. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and
Market Structure, in 2H ANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1059, 1062 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
21. GARY A. STEINMAN,C ONFERENCE BOARD,R EP.N O. 1182-97-CH, MANAGING,
VALUING, AND PROTECTINGINTELLECTUALASSETS 7 (1997).
viewpoint is still constrained by the same fundamental problem: “[I]n
the study of innovation and technical change in industry [there are no]
satisfactory measures of new knowledge and its contribution to
technological progress. There exists no measure of innovation that
permits readily interpretable cross-industry comparisons.”
20
Companies such as Dow Chemical have encouraged their
employees to invent as much and generate as many patents as
possible, without necessarily focusing on the strategic value of such
activities. Dow “produced a lot of knowledge, patents, and
intellectual property that did not create value” directly for Dow.
21 But
those same assets might be extremely valuable to other organizations.
The difficulty of measuring and valuing innovation as embodied
in a company’s intellectual assets becomes particularly apparent when
a company wants to acquire another company or the rights to exploit
its intellectual assets. In the absence of a standardized marketplace
for intellectual assets, a company might not even be aware that it has
an intellectual asset that is valued by another company. Even
organizations that are aware of their intellectual assets may tend to
choose royalty rates based on a rule of thumb rather than rates based
on quantitative metrics or analyses of profitability. Before examining
quantitative methods that can be employed to calculate royalty rates,
it is necessary to explore the nature of intellectual asset transactions.
B. The Nature of Intellectual Asset Transactions
Unlike real estate, a given intellectual asset can be “sold” many
times and to multiple entities and for use in different places
simultaneously. This range of possibilities gives rise to a multitude of
options for transferring rights to an intellectual asset. In general,
rights can be either licensed or sold outright. A licensor exacts from a
licensee a fee for the right to exploit in a defined way an asset to
which the former retains ownership. In a sale, sometimes referred to
as an assignment, the asset is transferred to a new owner. Owing to
the uncertain absolute value of intellectual assets, licensing is far
more common than sale unless the entire company is being sold.
Intellectual asset rights for a technology can be licensed
individually or aggregated and licensed as a bundle. Licensing can be
either exclusive (to only one licensee) or nonexclusive (to potentially
multiple licensees). The scope of a license can be further limitedIntellectual Asset Transactions 8
22. Tom Arnold, Basic Considerations in Licensing, LES NOUVELLES, Sept. 1980.
23. See MAX BAZERMAN,J UDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 125 (4th
ed. 1998); MAX H. BAZERMAN &M ARGARET A. NEALE,N EGOTIATING RATIONALLY 95
(1992); Max H. Bazerman & James J. Gillespie, Betting on the Future: The Virtues of
Contingent Contracts,H ARV.B US.R EV., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 155.
24. See INTELLECTUALPROP.R ESEARCHASSOCS.,THEROYALTYRATE REPORT FOR
PHARMACEUTICALS &B IOTECHNOLOGY (3d ed. 1996); TAYLOR &S ILBERSTON, supra
note 5; Anand & Khanna, supra note 9; Bessy & Brousseau, supra note 9; Caves et al.,
supra note 9. Note that the royalty rates themselves were not analyzed in these studies.
geographically, temporally, or by field of use. Additionally, licensees
might be permitted to sublicense the rights to a technology and
appropriate the benefits derived therefrom. Moreover, “most favored
nation” status can guarantee specific licensees as good or better terms
and conditions than are granted to other licensees.
Although quite different in many ways, the licensing of
intellectual assets is still somewhat analogous to a real estate lease.
The owner retains ownership of the property and assigns certain rights
to another party for a defined period of time and in return receives
compensation, monetary or otherwise. The similarity ends rather
abruptly, however, when the task turns to determining what the
compensation should be, particularly if it is solely monetary. Tom
Arnold, one of the original founders of the Licensing Executives
Society (“LES”), aptly described licensing as follows:
The licensing process is an art practiced in
negotiation between two or more parties. The
process is frequently difficult since its success
requires that the parties agree on the exploitation of
often highly valuable intellectual property rights in
which both have, claim or want an interest. The
range of interests, intellectual property rights, and
exploitation arrangements is limitless, making the
process of negotiating a mutually desirable
agreement from the myriad possibilities indeed an
art.
22
However “artistic” the negotiation of a license, the result is an
agreement that affects both parties economically. More common than
a lump sum license payment for a technology, particularly an
unproven technology, is the negotiation of a royalty rate or contingent
license fee on future earnings or sales. The negotiation literature
clearly indicates a strong theoretical basis for using contingent
contracts for transactions with high degrees of uncertainty,
23 and the
few empirical explorations of technology licensing agreements have
found a high incidence of contingent contracts.
24Intellectual Asset Transactions 9
Even the IPRA study did not examine the use of heuristic licensing rates other than to
mention that the 5% of sales regime was found in unrelated industries.
25. Robert Goldscheider, Measuring Damages in U.S. Patent Litigation,5J .
PROPRIETARYRTS. No. 5, at 2, 6–7 (1993).
26. INTELLECTUALPROP.R ESEARCHASSOCS., supra note 24, at 17.
If a lump sum arrangement is used, either instead of or in addition
to a royalty rate, the amount of the payment is usually based on the
present value of a stream of royalty payments. The challenge in any
of these transactions is thus to determine what the appropriate royalty
rate should be. The rate should approximate, as nearly as possible,
the fair rate of return on the intellectual asset rights that are to be
transferred. Historically, intellectual asset licenses have rarely used
significant quantitative analysis and have instead relied on common
rules of thumb. Another founder of LES, Robert Goldscheider, has
long been a proponent of one of the more common rules of thumb, the
25 percent rule:
The 25 Percent Rule originally occurred to [me] as a
result of a series of successful commercial licenses
with which [I] became involved back in the late
1950s. .... H a v i n gn o t i c e d[ a n ]e m p i r i c a l
relationship whereby there was a 25-75 split in the
pre-tax profitability rate in a series of successful
licenses, [I] developed a methodology that has
proven its worth over the years in commercial
negotiations. One starts with a 25 percent split [of
the pre-tax profits] to the licensor and then either
“tunes” this figure up or down, depending on the
peculiar circumstances of each case ....
25
In an empirical examination of royalty rates for a variety of
technologies, the Intellectual Property Research Associates found
another rule of thumb royalty rate:
For unknown reasons, one of the most popular
r o y a l t yr a t e si s5 %o fs a l e s ..... I ts h o w su pi nal o t
of different industries. It is associated with
embryonic technology and mature trademarks. It has
been found in the food, industrial equipment,
electronics, construction and medical device
industries. Forget profits, capital investment,
earnings growth, operating expenses, investment risk
and even development costs. Somehow 5% of sales
prevails. Don’t be fooled. It’s not a magic bullet
answer.
26Intellectual Asset Transactions 10
27. See SMITH &P ARR, supra note 10, at 368; PARR &S ULLIVAN, supra note 10, at
184.
28. HERMAN MELVILLE,M OBY DICK 330 (Heritage Press 1956) (1851), quoted in
GORDON V. SMITH &R USSELL L. PARR,V ALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 377(2d ed. 1994)).
29. See, e.g.,S MITH&PARR, supra note10;PARR&SULLIVAN, supra note10;Stiroh
& Rapp, supra note 10; Toikka, supra note 10.
30. See Gavin Clarkson & Jasjit Singh, Optimal Structures in Contingent Licensing
Contracts (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (developing a theoretical
proof demonstrating that, all else being equal, a percentage of revenue regime is superior
to a percentage of profits regime).
31. Similar problems also exist for the licensee, although they are not the main focus
of this article. It is possible for a rule of thumb license to place a licensee in a worse
economic position than if it had done nothing at all. For a more detailed examination, see
CLARKSON &A PPLEGATE, supra note 12. See also SMITH &P ARR, supra note 10, at
372–78.
32. See Mark Gimein, Palm and Handspring Go Hand to Hand,F ORTUNE, Sept. 18,
2000, at 319, available at 2000 WL 24218220.
33. See id.
A third rule of thumb is the so-called industry norm that relies on
the potentially faulty assumption that the negotiators of the earlier
licenses in the industry had correctly considered and interpreted the
myriad of factors affecting royalty rates.
27 All of the prior mistakes
made are passed along “as silly sheep leap over a vacuum, because
their leader originally leaped there when a stick was held.”
28
Each of these rules of thumb has been criticized
29 and some have
even been shown to be suboptimal,
30 but over time they have become
entrenched as industry standards without necessarily reflecting the
actual value of the intellectual asset rights being transferred. Both the
25 percent of profits and 5 percent of sales methods are obvious
oversimplifications and do not take into account variations in industry
and relative contributions to profit by different types of intellectual
assets.
Worse yet, in some instances the licensor may end up “leaving
money on the table” by not extracting value comparable to the
average contribution to profit of intellectual property and intellectual
assets for the industry as a whole (i.e., companies that exploit their
intellectual assets internally are generating a higher rate of return than
the rate earned by a rule of thumb royalty).
31 One such example may
be Handspring’s license of the Palm operating system. Some analysts
have indicated that Palm receives as little as $8 per unit (or
approximately 5 percent of the average price) of the various models
of Handspring’s Visor.
32 By comparison, Palm generates a gross
profit margin of 40 percent on sales of its own devices, a large portion
of which can be allocated to profits due to intellectual assets.
33Intellectual Asset Transactions 11
34. See, e.g., Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11,
21–22(Fed. Cir. 1984);Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d1481,1535
(D. Mass. 1990); Syntex Inc. v. Paragon Optical Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1001, 1027 (D. Ariz.
1987); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 350 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
35. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2575 (T.C. 1998).
36. Id. at 2588 n.9 (citing Kerwit Med. Prods., Inc. v. N & H Instruments, Inc., 224
U.S.P.Q. 679, 691 n.6 (N.D. Tex. 1984)).
Unfortunately, courts have not been immune to application of
these rules of thumb, particularly the 25 Percent Rule.
34 Courts have
been induced to apply rules of thumb such as the 25 Percent Rule in
part because expert witnesses, such as Mr. Goldscheider, are often the
strongest advocates for these heuristics. In Podd v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,
35 the judge noted that in
a previous case before a Federal District Court in
Texas, Mr. Goldscheider offered expert testimony on
the subject of what a reasonable royalty would be
and the judge in that case commented that Mr.
Goldscheider’s credibility was adversely affected
due to his appearance as an advocate rather than a
detached expert.
36
The advocacy of expert witnesses, however, cannot be the only
explanation for the use of royalty rates based on rules of thumb.
There must be other explanations.
III. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
In order to look for ways to improve the marketplace for
intellectual asset transactions, it is first necessary to examine possible
explanations for how the present situation arose and why it has not
corrected itself on its own. Economic theory suggests that the
necessary information is too costly to acquire (i.e., difficult to obtain
or not available at all), resulting in only a small number of intellectual
asset transactions based on rigorous quantitative analysis, with the
remainder covered by rules of thumb. Economic theory also suggests
possible reasons why organizations internalize innovation and thus
why licensing is not more widespread. Organizational behavior
theory suggests that some forms of bounded rationality or heuristic
usage, as well as organizational inertia, are responsible for the
continued use of these rules of thumb. The answer probably lies
somewhere in the middle.
A. Economic PerspectiveIntellectual Asset Transactions 12
37. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, in
ORGANIZATION THEORY 154, 160 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1995); see also Sanford J.
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration,9 4J .P OL.E CON. 694 (1986).
38. Hart, supra note 37, at 160.
39. See id. at 161.
40. Id.
41. KENNETHJ.ARROW,T HE LIMITS OFORGANIZATION 33 (1974).
The economic perspective contributes at least three concepts that
are helpful in understanding the present situation in intellectual asset
transactions. First, the property rights view of the firm is a good
starting point for examining the arena of intellectual assets
themselves. Second, certain economic explanations for why firms
organize are helpful in understanding why firms internalize
innovative activity rather than licensing innovations from outside.
The third set of ideas, transaction cost theory, lends the most insight
into why rules of thumb are used rather than quantitative methods for
determining licensing rates in intellectual asset transactions.
Information regarding the value of intellectual assets is expensive and
has historically been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
The economic view of the firm as a collection of property rights
has particular relevance in the arena of intellectual asset transactions.
This approach is complementary to the transaction cost economic
theories of Coase and Williamson, but it focuses on non-human
assets, particularly in contractual relationships.
37 The basic premise
for this view is that the right to control the usage of an asset “resides
with the owner of the asset. Ownership of an asset goes together with
the possession of residual rights of control over that asset, that is, the
owner has the right to use the asset any way that is not inconsistent
with a prior contract, a custom, or any law.”
38 Furthermore, the
property rights view of the firm specifically includes intellectual
assets such as patents and copyrights.
39 The resulting theory is that in
“a world of transaction costs and incomplete contracts, ex-post
residual rights of control are important because, through their
influence on asset usage, they affect ex-post bargaining power and the
division of ex-post surplus in a relationship.”
40 It is that division of
ex post surplus from intellectual assets transactions that is of interest.
Economic theory has also contributed insight into why
technology licensing has historically been somewhat rare relative to
the level of innovation. Arrow asserts that “organizations are a means
of achieving the benefits of collective action in situations in which the
price system fails.”
41 Since, in the past, there has not been much of a
marketplace for intellectual asset transactions, the best way for anIntellectual Asset Transactions 13
42. W.RICHARDSCOTT,ORGANIZATIONS:R ATIONAL,NATURAL,ANDOPENSYSTEMS
156 (4th ed. 1998) (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,M ARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975)).
43. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 155 (citing Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4E CONOMICA 386 (1937)); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,T HE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,M ARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES:A NALYSISANDANTITRUSTIMPLICATIONS(1975);OLIVERE.WILLIAMSON,
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 77 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994).
44. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 155–56.
organization to obtain intellectual assets was to create them internally
rather than try to license them from another organization. This
premise is bolstered by the fact that intellectual asset transactions are
not entirely understood by the average manager, in part because they
are legal in nature. Williamson’s model of the conditions under
which markets tend to give way to organizations adds the idea that
“under certain environmental conditions, ...a ni n d i v i d u a l ’ s
cognitive capacities are insufficient. It is the coupling of cognitive
limitations with high levels of uncertainty and complexity that
encourage individuals to move the affected transactions out of
markets and into organizations.”
42 Such reasoning clearly relates to
Simon’s concept of bounded rationality and Kahneman & Tversky’s
concept of heuristics, which are discussed in the next section.
Although the relatively low number of intellectual assets
transactions as compared to the level of innovation is consistent with
economic theory’s view of the firm, the question of why still remains.
What causes the high levels of complexity and uncertainty, resulting
in such a small marketplace for intellectual asset transactions? Can
this marketplace ever be expanded and fully realized, since
determining the optimal way to divide the ex post surplus from an
intellectual asset transaction requires a great deal of information about
the transaction’s environment?
One source of answers is transaction cost economics, particularly
its focus on the cost of obtaining information. This theory, based on
work done by Coase and later by Williamson, “shifts attention from
technology and production costs to transaction costs—the costs
associated with reaching and policing agreements about the exchange
of goods and services between persons or across boundaries.....
T h e s ec o s t sr a n g ef r o mt h o s eo fo b t a i n i n gi n f o r m a t i o n ,...
negotiating agreements, policing agreements, to settling disputes.”
43
Whereas “[s]imple market transactions work well as a framework for
s p o tc o n t r a c t s ,....[ t ] h e yf a r el e s sw e l lw h e nt h et r a n s a c t i o n si n v o l v e
future values.”
44 Since most intellectual asset transactions are
licenses for future royalty payments, it becomes easier to understandIntellectual Asset Transactions 14
45. Id. at 200 (citing BAZERMAN&N EALE, supra note 23).
46. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 160 (citing ARROW, supra note 41, at 69).
47. ROBERT C. HIGGINS,A NALYSIS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 318 (5th ed.
1998). “[T]he FMV of a business is the higher of its liquidation value and its going-
concern value,” where going-concern value is “the present worth of expected future cash
flows generated by a business.” Id. This concept is similar to the income approach to
valuation, discussed infra text accompanying note 54.
48. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
49. SMITH&P ARR, supra note 10, at 160.
the historically small level of market transactions for intellectual
assets.
Similarly, because licensing negotiations ultimately require
decisions to agree when there is insufficient information to
comfortably support those decisions, the number of such transactions
will be small. As Scott points out, “bargaining and negotiation are
complex activities, requiring knowledge of one’s own interests and
priorities, those of others, information about the current and likely
future states of affairs, knowledge of rule systems and norms
governing agreements, and related matters.”
45 Arrow notes that the
gathering of information is also essential to arriving at a decision.
46
Thus, absent sufficient information, such negotiations are unlikely to
conclude satisfactorily, if they take place at all, without resorting to a
rule of thumb which requires less information than a quantitative
analysis.
But what exactly is the information that is so difficult to obtain?
It is the fair market value (“FMV”) of the various rights to the
intellectual assets involved in the transaction. In general, FMV “is
the price at which an asset would trade between two rational
individuals, each in command of all of the information necessary to
value the asset and neither under any pressure to trade.”
47 Relating
this concept to royalty rates, courts have often used a variation of
FMV in the form of a “willing buyer and willing seller” rule in an
attempt to calculate patent infringement damages.
48 The difficulties
lie in the fact that intellectual asset valuations are not easy to obtain,
unlike valuations of real estate, where market comparables give a
fairly close approximation of the FMV of a piece of land.
In general, the market approach “measures the present value of
future benefits by obtaining a consensus of what others in the
marketplace have judged it to be. There are two requisites: an active,
public market and an exchange of comparable properties.”
49
Unfortunately, these two requisites rarely exist for a sufficiently
strong estimate of value of intellectual assets; it is often difficult, if
not impossible, to find even one market comparable transaction that
can be used to assist in valuing another transaction. The exampleIntellectual Asset Transactions 15
50. See generally Joseph Costello, Overcoming the Behemoth: The Urgent Need for
a Private Legal System in Electronics, in CAPITAL FOR OUR TIME:T HE ECONOMIC,
LEGAL, AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 51 (Nicholas
Imparato ed., 1999).
51. TheIPEXisavailableathttp://www.ipex.net. OtherexchangesincludeYet2.com
(http://www.yet2.com), the Patent and Licensing Exchange (http://www.pl-x.com), and
the Intellectual Property Technology Exchange (http://www.techex.com).
52. See SMITH&P ARR, supra note 10, at 164.
53. See Eric N. Berg, Now “Intrapreneurship” Is Hot,N . Y .T IMES, Apr. 4, 1985, at
D1 (describing the development of Post-It Notes).
54. See SMITH&P ARR, supra note 10, at 257.
closest to a public market is the Virtual Socket Alliance (“VSA”), a
consortium of 125 semiconductor companies that has created a
private system for exchanging intellectual assets related to the
electronics industry.
50 Along with the VSA, other initiatives such as
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Intellectual Property Exchange (“IPEX”)
51
are attempting to create public markets for intellectual assets, but
these efforts are in the early stages of development.
Cost basis valuations are not very helpful either. The cost
approach attempts to measure the future benefits of the license of a
technology by quantifying the investment that would be required to
replace the future service capability of the technology, frequently
referred to as replacement cost.
52 Often the cost approach is a very
conservative if not a poor method of valuation because a company
can invest very little in technology and invent something with value
that greatly exceeds cost. One such example of a breakthrough
technology is Post-It Notes, which 3M introduced in 1980. This
simple invention cost 3M very little to develop,
53 but the company has
reaped huge profits from an entire line of products based on the
original invention.
The third method, the income approach, is based on the premise
that the FMV of an intellectual asset—or any asset for that
matter—can be expressed as the present value of the anticipated
stream of economic benefits that can be secured by ownership of the
asset.
54 In essence, this approach examines the income-producing
capability of an intellectual asset to determine its value. The three
main questions answered by the income approach are:
(1) What is the income stream that will be generated over time by
the intellectual asset?
(2) How long will that stream last?
(3) What is the likelihood that the forecasted income stream will
materialize?Intellectual Asset Transactions 16
55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56. See Oliver E. Williamson, Chester Barnard and the Incipient Science of
Organization, in ORGANIZATION THEORY 172, 179 (Oliver E. Williamson ed., expanded
ed. 1995) (summarizing the economic perspective on bounded rationality as “all complex
contracts are unavoidably incomplete.”).
57. HERBERT A. SIMON,M ODELS OFMAN:S OCIAL AND RATIONAL 198 (1957).
In addition to the fact that the income approach is not readily
understood by managers when applied to intellectual assets, it is clear
from these three questions that the income approach is rife with
uncertainty and speculation absent some form of robust metrics. Thus
the view of the environment for intellectual asset transactions is one
in which these transactions are moved out of markets and into
organizations,
55 and rules of thumb are used for whatever market
transactions remain.
At this point, it would seem appropriate to merge the economic
perspective with the organizational behavior perspective, particularly
regarding the concepts of bounded rationality and heuristics. The
organizational behavior perspective on bounded rationality and
heuristics provide superior insight into the present status of
intellectual asset transactions than does the economic perspective on
bounded rationality.
56
B. Organizational Behavior Perspective
Since managers normally have neither sufficient information nor
quantitative metrics to make fully informed decisions in intellectual
asset negotiations, their use of a rule of thumb in the few transactions
that do take place in the market seems to be evidence of “satisficing,”
or settling for a method that is good enough, rather than expending
additional effort to find a superior approach. Simon’s definition of
bounded rationality describes this situation almost exactly:
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and
solving complex problems is very small compared
with the size of the problems whose solution is
required for objectively rational behavior in the real
world.
57
Simon continued, stating that
[t]he key to simplification of the choice process . . .
is the replacement of the goal of maximizing with the
goal of satisficing, or finding a course of action that
is ‘good enough.’ . . . [T]his substitution is anIntellectual Asset Transactions 17
58. Id., at 204–05 (emphasis in original).
59. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 50.
60. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974).
61. SeeBAZERMAN, supra note23, at6 (“Managers assessthefrequency, probability,
or likely causes of an event by the degree to which instances or occurrences of that event
are readily ‘available’ in memory.”).
62. See id. at 7(“Managers make assessments by starting from an initial value and
a d j u s t i n gt oy i e l daf i n a ld e c i s i o n . .... I na m b i g u o u ss i t u a t i o n s ,at r i v i a lf a c t o rc a nh a v e
a profound effect on our decision if it serves as a starting point from which we make
adjustments.”).
63. See id. (“Managers assess the likelihood of an event’s occurrence by the
similarity of that occurrence to their stereotypes of similar occurrences.”).
64. See BAZERMAN&N EALE, supra note 23; BAZERMAN, supra note 23.
65. WALTER W. POWELL &P AUL J. DIMAGGIO,T HE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 19 (1991).
essential step in the application of the principle of
bounded rationality.
58
Simon provided this concept as an alternative to “the ‘economic
man’ motivated by self-interest and completely informed about all
a v a i l a b l ea l t e r n a t i v e s...[ a n dw h o ]i sw illing to settle for an adequate
solution in contrast with an optimal one.”
59
Fifteen years after Simon’s original publication of his theories of
bounded rationality, Kahneman and Tversky extended the theory by
introducing heuristics and explaining the potential pitfalls of their use.
[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles which reduce the complex tasks of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to
simpler judgmental operations. In general, these
heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead
to severe and systematic errors.
60
Availability,
61 Anchoring and Adjustment,
62 and
Representativeness
63 are the heuristics elucidated by Kahneman and
Tversky that Bazerman identifies as potentially impacting
negotiations.
64 These heuristics should be considered when
evaluating heuristic behavior in licensing.
Such concepts explain the use of rules of thumb in intellectual
asset transactions. DiMaggio and Powell have credited March and
Simon with the observation that “organizational behavior, particularly
decision making, involves rule following more than [quantitative]
calculation.”
65 March and Simon have also been credited with the
idea that “organizations face environments of varying complexity,
that they must adjust their internal decision-making apparatus to takeIntellectual Asset Transactions 18
66. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 110–11.
67. Id. at 53–54 (quoting JAMES D. THOMPSON,O RGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 54
(1967)).
68. Id. at 54.
69. Id. at 213.
70. Id. at 54 (citing Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,A M.S OC.
REV., Apr. 1983, at 147, 152).
71. See generally Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, in READINGS IN MANAGERIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 439 (Harold J. Leavitt et al. eds., 1971).
72. See BAZERMAN, supra note 23, at 151–52 (recognizing that the Kahneman and
Tversky heuristics can also play a role with groups)
these variations into account, and that some environments pose levels
of complexity that the organizations cannot manage unless they
impose simplifying restrictions on the information processed.”
66
Similarly, Thompson elucidated the concept of bounded rationality
arising from organizational structure: “‘structure is a fundamental
vehicle by which organizations achieve bounded rationality.’ The
specification of positions, role definitions, procedural rules and
regulations [as] inputs that guide decision making—all function to
canalize behavior in the service of predetermined goals.”
67 According
to Scott, bounded rationality can beceome part of the organizational
structure rather than reemain a part of the individuals themselves as
“rules that assure participants will behave in ways calculated to
achieve desired objectives.”
68
Not only does the organizational behavior perspective shed light
on why a single firm might “satisfice” by choosing a rule of thumb
for valuing an intellectual asset transaction, it also helps to explain
why such heuristics become commonplace through organizational
conformity. Actors in the current marketplace for intellectual asset
transactions use these rules of thumb because the lack of preferable
alternatives entrench them as the only viable methods of choice. “We
do it this way because this is the way we have always done it, and this
is how everyone expects it to be done in the industry.” Scott
elaborates on this concept in his discussion of structural conformity:
“Sometimes environmental actors impose very specific structural
requirements on organizations as a condition for acceptance and
support. Organizations are required to adopt specific structural
elements [such as rules of thumb] in order to merit approval.”
69
Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell point out that “organizations
confronting high levels of uncertainty often borrow structural forms,
sometimes by consciously modeling a successful form.”
70
“Groupthink”
71 may also be a factor in highly cohesive groups.
72 It isIntellectual Asset Transactions 19
73. See generally S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and
Distortion of Judgements, in BASIC STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 393 (Harold M.
Proshansky & Bernard Seidenberg eds., 1965).
74. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 215.
75. Id. at 215 (citing EUGENEBARDACH&R OBERTA.KAGAN,G OING BY THEBOOK:
THE PROBLEM OFREGULATORYUNREASONABLENESS (1982)).
76. Id. at 54.
77. See generally FREDERICK W. TAYLOR,T HE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT (1911).
thus possible that rational participants might be persuaded to adopt
heuristic positions because of group pressure.
73
In Scott’s discussion of procedural conformity, he places some
blame for the need to satisfice rather than optimize in intellectual
asset transactions on lawyers: “Even when the demands being
enforced are primarily technical, the requirements are often couched
in procedural language—the language of lawyers—rather than in
language that attempts to specify [efficient] outcomes.”
74 He also
identifies other criticisms of lawyers, noting that “these procedures
readily become disconnected from outcomes, creating legalistic
mazes and bureaucratic rituals rather than providing a framework to
support rational decision making.”
75 Finally, Scott notes that for
decisions made near the top of an organization, including intellectual
asset transactions, “as long as [the value premises that govern
decision making] are specific enough to provide clear criteria for
choice, these premises can support a ‘rational’ structure no matter
how monstrous or perverted their content.”
76 It is probably a bit harsh
to describe the rules of thumb used in intellectual asset transactions as
“monstrous or perverted”; nevertheless, there must be ways to




In addition to shedding light on the present state of the market for
intellectual asset transactions, these perspectives, particularly the
organizational behavior perspective, provide guidance on how these
transactions might be made both more efficient and more numerous.
Oddly enough, the basis for these improvements can be found in the
scientific management approach developed by Frederick Taylor in the
early 1900s.
77 Citing Taylor’s work, Scott defines “performance
programs” asIntellectual Asset Transactions 20
78. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 250 (citing TAYLOR, supra note 77; FREDERICK W.
TAYLOR,S CIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 189 (1947)).
79. FREDERICKW. TAYLOR,S CIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 189 (1947).
80. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 51–52.
81. Id. at 86.
sets of activities that are performed in a regular and
predictable way to carry out the work of the
organization, [and according to rational systems
theory,] these programs can and should be
rationalized: engineers and technical staff must
analyze the work requirements and design the
necessary operations so as to minimize time and
resource use.
78
For organizations dealing with intellectual assets, the valuation
metrics for intellectual assets could be considered performance
programs.
If Taylor’s principles apply to intellectual assets, it must be
possible to analyze intellectual asset transactions scientifically in
order to discover those procedures that would produce the maximum
efficiency while still minimizing the input of information and the
amount of uncertainty. Taylor would probably seek to replace rules
of thumb with analytical, scientific procedures. According to Taylor,
the decision maker “under scientific management is governed by rules
and laws which have been developed through hundreds of
experiments.”
79 In the arena of intellectual asset transactions,
however, it may not be necessary to conduct experiments if the
information can be obtained from publicly available data.
Suppose that the necessary information is available to optimize
intellectual asset transactions, but the marketplace is not aware of it.
If the marketplace could be made aware of the information and given
the metrics to utilize it, then it is likely that intellectual asset
transactions would become more efficient and more numerous. Many
elements of organizational behavior theory support this conclusion.
According to Scott, organizations “support participants in the
d e c i s i o n st h e ym u s tm a k e...b yp r o v i d i n gt h e mw i t ht h en ecessary
means to handle them: resources, information, equipment.”
80
Systems theory states that “the setting of goals is based on
information received from the environment so that favorable
exchanges between the environment and organization can occur.”
81
Thus, the organization must be convinced that the information is
available if it is to view increased efficiency in intellectual asset
transactions as a reachable goal.Intellectual Asset Transactions 21
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83. SCOTT, supra note 42, at 112 (discussing the work of Oliver Williamson).
84. JAMES G. MARCH,AP RIMER ON DECISION MAKING:H OW DECISIONS HAPPEN
10 (1994).
85. See JEFFREY PFEFFER &G ERALD R. SALANCIK,T HE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS:AR ESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 74 (1978).
86. Id. at 75.
Intellectual asset transactions will always, by nature, be complex
and subject to uncertainty and risk. Therefore, greater availability of
information will be critical to any increase in the efficiency or number
of these transactions. According to Galbraith, “the greater the task
uncertainty, the greater the amount of information that must be
processed among decision makers during task execution in order to
achieve a given level of performance.”
82 A mere increase in
information is insufficient, however, to overcome the problems of
bounded rationality.
Metrics that facilitate the processing of the information are also
required. According to transaction cost theory, “as exchanges
become more complex and uncertain—because the environment is not
stable or predictable . . .—various kinds of external controls and
supports must be devised to aid the exchanges—that is, to reduce the
transaction costs.”
83 This conclusion is also reinforced when one
considers March’s concept of attention structure. If the organization is
swamped with information, it will not be able to process the
information adequately in order to optimize the intellectual asset
transaction. According to March,
Time and capabilities for attention are limited. Not
everything can be attended to at once. Too many
signals are received. Too many things are relevant
to a decision. Because of these limitations, theories
of decision making are often better described as
theories of attention or search than as theories of
choice. They are concerned with the way in which
scarce attention is allocated.
84
However, if the organization has sufficient metrics or information
processing systems, as defined by Pfeffer and Salancik,
85 then the
organization can focus its scarce attention on optimizing the
intellectual asset transaction because the “information systems are
designed and created to provide the information that the decision
maker requires.”
86Intellectual Asset Transactions 22
87. See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
88. See supra note 17.
89. The terms CPIA (contribution to profit of intangible assets), IPIA (intellectual
property and intellectual assets), and CPIPIA (contribution to profit of IPIA) are new
terms contrived for this discussion of intellectual asset valuation. The author accepts full
blame (or credit) for their relative utility in this analysis.
90. A somewhat similar measure, the Knowledge Capital Scoreboard developed by
Professor Baruch Lev of New York University, identifies the total intangible asset value
for several companies, but does not readily generate proxies for royalty rates. See Baruch
Lev & S.L. Mintz, Seeing is Believing: A Better Approach to Estimating Knowledge
Capital,C F OM AGAZINE, Feb. 1999, at 29, available at 1999 WL 8850771.
B. Proposed Methodology
After exploring economic and behavioral concepts in order to
explain the current state of affairs in the marketplace for intellectual
asset transactions, it is clear that those same perspectives also provide
the impetus for increasing both transaction efficiency and numerosity
by obtaining additional information and by providing metrics to
process that information. As mentioned previously,
87 one potential
quantitative approach to determining asking price involves the use of
publicly available industry information together with basic financial
formulas to determine the contribution to profit of intellectual assets.
Expressed as percentage of sales, this result can be used as a starting
point for royalty rate negotiations or as a “reality check” for royalty
rates determined by other means.
This proposed method follows from the premise that the licensor
should be able to extract from the licensee a royalty stream that is
comparable to its own return on intellectual property and intellectual
assets (“IPIA”).
88 Alternatively, a licensor can look to its industry for
the average return on IPIA. Since returns on intellectual assets are
not normally reported in company financial statements, it is necessary
to derive them from whatever data is available. An industry average
contribution to profit from intellectual property and intellectual assets
(“CPIPIA”)
89 can be derived from annual reports and other publicly
available information. Before a measure for intellectual assets can be
derived, however, the contribution to profit of intangible assets
(“CPIA”), which includes intellectual assets, must be derived. Once
CPIA is determined, the calculation of CPIPIA is straightforward.
For those not familiar with corporate finance concepts, the CPIA
metric is, in essence, an expression of the percentage of a company’s
profits that are due to its intangible assets. Intangible assets are assets
other than monetary assets (i.e., cash and liquid securities on hand)
and tangible assets (i.e., property, plant and equipment).
90 CPIPIA is
derived in a given industry by subtracting the average CPIA value for
distributors from the CPIA value for a given manufacturer or aIntellectual Asset Transactions 23
91. See generally Higgins, supra note 47, at 277–78 (providing an excellent
discussion of the derivation of WACC).
92. Id. at 278.
93. SMITH&P ARR, supra note 10, at 360.
portfolio of manufacturers. For those more familiar with corporate
finance, the remainder of this section describes the derivation of
CPIA and the resulting CPIPIA.
1. Contribution to Profit of Intangible Assets – CPIA
This first metric is based on the existence of two formulations of
the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (“WACC”). The traditional
formulation of WACC
91 is
WACC E R D R R E R i t ii f p =+= + ×+ × − () () () ( ) β 1
where
E(Ri): expected rate of return for equity investors
D(Ri): expected rate of return for debt investors
Rf: r i s kf r e er a t eo fr e t u r n
$: beta or systematic risk
E(Rp): expected risk premium
i: interest rate on debt
t: effective federal and state tax rate
The theoretical underpinnings of WACC are based on the idea
that “a company’s cost of capital is the cost of the individual sources
of capital, weighted according to their importance in the firm’s capital
structure.”
92 WACC can thus be broken down into its relative
components, and be represented as a weighted average of the required





















Rm: return on monetary assets
Rt: r e t u r no nt a n g i b l ea s s e t s
Ri: return on intangible assets
Vm: fair market value of the monetary assets
Vt: fair market value of the tangible assetsIntellectual Asset Transactions 24
94. Note that Lev’s methodology for deriving knowledge-based earnings is based on
a very similar residual calculation. See Lev & Mintz, supra note 90.
95. Cf. RICHARD A. BREALEY &S TEWART C. MYERS,P RINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 548 & n.8 (6th ed. 2000) (suggesting use of T-Bill and T-Bond rates to represent
return on monetary and tangible assets respectively).
96. The mechanics of these calculations are fairly straightforward. From the balance
sheet of a given firm,Vm is the total Working Capital, Vt is the total Fixed Assets, and Vbev
is the total Market Cap of the firm plus the short term and long term debt.
VV VV ib e v m t =− − .
97. DFNI is roughly equivalent to EBIAT, Earnings Before Interest but After Taxes.
Vi: fair market value of the intangible assets
Vbev: the fair market value of the business enterprise (the sum of
Vm, Vt,a n dVi).











































Using the 3-month T-Bill for Rm and the 10-year T-Bond for Rt,
95
one can calculate the respective weighted returns for monetary and
tangible assets using data from a company’s balance sheets and
income statements.
96 As shown above, subtracting the weighted rate
of return on monetary assets and tangible assets from WACC yields
the weighted rate of return for intangible assets.
To obtain the weighted return on intangibles as a percentage of
the total cost of capital, Riw is divided by the previously derived
WACC value. Multiplying this value by Debt Free Net Income
(“DFNI”)
97 results in the contribution to profit by intangible assets
expressed in dollar terms.
DFNI NI InterestExpense tax = + − () 1
Dividing that value by sales gives us CPIA expressed as a percentage.Intellectual Asset Transactions 25
98. For example, pharmaceutical companies such as Amerisource, McKesson, and
Bergen Brunswig do not engage in substantial IPIA creation, whereas companies such as
Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Schering-Plough have substantial IPIA
portfolios. Similar dichotomies have been observed in the electronics, computer
hardware, computer software, chemical, cosmetics, and food products industries. See,
e.g.,P ARR&SULLIVAN,supranote10,at232 (computerhardware);SMITH&PARR, supra








To recap, (Riw / WACC)×DFNI expresses the portion of a firm's
profits that are due to intangible assets. Contingent royalties,
however, are properly expressed as a percentage of sales. Dividing
(Riw/ WACC)×DFNI by sales results in such a percentage. This
calculation can be repeated for all of the companies in an industry to
arrive at an average CPIA.
2. Contribution to Profit of Intellectual Assets – CPIPIA
Because CPIA still includes the contribution to profit of
intangible assets other than intellectual property and intellectual
assets, these non-IPIA elements must be filtered out in order to arrive
at a CPIPIA that can then be used as the licensor’s starting point for
royalty rate negotiations. In a given industry, some companies might
have strong IPIA portfolios while other, equally well-run companies
may lack IPIA.
98 Subtracting an industry average for CPIA for
companies without IPIA from the CPIA value for a company with an
IPIA portfolio, or an industry average for companies with IPIA
portfolios, yields a value for CPIPIA, the contribution to profit of
both intellectual property and intellectual assets for a given company
or industry.
C. Empirical Analysis and Validation of Metrics
Although not an exact measure of a company’s intellectual asset
value, CPIPIA seems to be a good industry-based approximation.
CPIPIA is an appropriate starting point for royalty rate negotations by
virtue of its basis in a WACC calculation that is specific to the
company in question. Since the CPIPIA metric is based on
hypothesized behavior of CPIA, that behavior should be demonstrated
empirically before any further exploration of CPIPIA is warranted.Intellectual Asset Transactions 26
99. SIC codes are promulgated by the National Technical Information Service. See
generallyNat'lTech. Info. Serv., NTIS Web Site Home Page, athttp://www.ntis.gov/ (last
visited Apr. 25, 2001).
100. As shown in the Appendix, however, some of the companies in the 5122
classification do engage in some level of R&D expenditure.
101. See Standard & Poor, Institutional Market Services, at
http://www.compustat.com/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
102. See Primark Corp., Products, at http://www.datastream.com/product/has/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
103. Only companies with positive DFNI and for which revenues were greater than
DFNI were included. The resulting sample included 58 firms, which are listed in the
Appendix.
The main underlying assumption in the CPIA metric is that CPIA
values will be higher for companies with large intangible asset
portfolios and lower for companies with few or no intangible assets.
To verify this assumption, it is necessary to examine the relationship
among CPIA, R&D expenditures, and manufacturer/distributor
classification in a single industry. Given that many pharmaceutical
companies engage in significant R&D to increase their portfolios of
intangible assets, a positive correlationbetween R&D expenditures
and CPIA values should exist for companies in this industry.
H1: As a firm’s R&D expenditures increase as a
percentage of sales, so will its contribution to profit
of intangible assets increase as a percentage of sales.
The pharmaceutical industry is divided into two Standard
Industry Classification (“SIC”) codes.
99 SIC code 2834 primarily
contains manufacturers, and SIC code 5122 primarily contains
distributors.
100 Manufacturers generally engage in more R&D relative
to sales volume than do distributors. Thus, if CPIA behaves as
expected, then firms in the 5122 classification will have lower CPIA
values than those classified in 2834.
H2: Classification as a manufacturer is associated
with having a higher CPIA value than classification
as a distributor.
Using Compustat
101 financial statement data and Datastream
102
bond rate data, a value for CPIA can be calculated for each
pharmaceutical company.
103 Then using Compustat R&D expenditure
data, the following Ordinary Least Squares model can be evaluated:
CPIA RDSALES SIC =+× +× ββ β 01 2Intellectual Asset Transactions 27
104. Regressing CPIA against RDSALES alone also indicated a significant (p < .001)
relationship, but with a lower r
2 (.4447). Similar indications resulted from a model with
only CPIA and SIC (p < .001 and r
2= .2453).
where RDSALES is R&D expenditure expressed as a percentage of
sales, and SIC is an indicator variable, 1 for manufacturers and 0 for
distributors.
Regression Results for
CPIA, RDSALES, and SIC Classification
Source | SS df MS Number of obs = 58
---------+------------------------------ F( 2, 55) = 32.27
Model | .346209023 2 .173104512 Prob > F = 0.0000
Residual | .295076552 55 .005365028 R-squared = 0.5399
---------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.5231
Total | .641285576 57 .011250624 Root MSE = .07325
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CPIA | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
RDSALES | .5391483 .0908553 5.934 0.000 .3570702 .7212263
SIC | .0939723 .0278601 3.373 0.001 .0381395 .1498052
_cons | .0121287 .0244155 0.497 0.621 -.0368011 .0610584
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The regression results, summarized in the table above, indicate
that the regression model explains more than half of the variance in
CPIA. Additionally, the results indicate both a significant (p < .001)
positive relationship between R&D expenditures as a percentage of
sales and CPIA, which confirms the first hypothesis. A significant (p
= .001) positive correlation between manufacturer/distributor status
and CPIA supports the second hypothesis.
With empirical support for both hypotheses, it is safe to proceed
with the application of the CPIPIA metric, since it is evident that
firms engaging in significant R&D or classified as manufacturers tend
to have higher CPIA values than firms with low R&D expenditures as
a percentage of sales and firms classified as distributors.
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D. Application of the CPIPIA Metric
Thus far, this article has developed a metric for calculating CPIA
from publicly available market data, has verified that firms that
engage in relatively higher levels of R&D as a percentage of sales
have higher CPIA values, and has demonstrated that bifurcation of an
industry into manufacturers and distributors is consistent with the
hypothesized behavior of CPIA. As a result, subtracting the average
CPIA value for a group of distributors from the CPIA value for a
given manufacturer results in a CPIPIA value that reflects
contribution to profit of intellectual assets for that manufacturer.Intellectual Asset Transactions 28
105. Note that median value is more resistant to outliers than is the mean, and thus
may be a more appropriate reflection of the midpoint of the data for certain distributions.
106. The resulting average CPIPIA for the sample data provided in the Appendix is
14.4%.
107. For example, the resulting CPIPIA for Merck for the sample data provided in the
Appendix is 17.3%.
108. The 95% confidence interval for the average CPIPIA for the sample data
provided in the Appendix is between 11.6% and 17.2% Note that this confidence interval
includes the 16.2% Knowledge Capital Earnings/Sales average for pharmaceuticals
generated by Lev. See Lev & Mintz, supra note 90.
109. Even if a royalty rate seems low relative to the industry average CPIPIA, there
may be other strategic reasons to enter into the licensing relationship when the benefits
outweigh the economic difference between the license rate and the industry average
CPIPIA.
Subtracting the average distributor CPIA from the average
manufacturer CPIA results in an industry CPIPIA.
How might one use this metric in an actual licensing transaction?
Two particular uses seem readily apparent. The first use is as a
starting point for a royalty rate negotiation. The second use is as a
“reality check” to validate a royalty rate derived through other
quantitative means.
To determine CPIPIA for an average company in an industry, the
starting point would be to use a set of company data, such as that
presented in the Appendix, to calculate CPIA for each company.
Companies would then be grouped into low CPIA (distributors) and
high CPIA (manufacturers) and the average CPIA values calculated
for each group.
105 The distributor CPIA value would be subtracted
from the manufacturer CPIA value to yield a CPIPIA value as an
industry average.
106 For a company-specific CPIPIA, the average
distributor CPIA value would be subtracted from the CPIA value for
that company.
107
To use CPIPIA to validate a royalty rate generated through other
means, a confidence interval for CPIPIA can be calculated to
determine whether the given rate falls within that interval.
108 If not, it
might be worthwhile to either reexamine the methodology used to




As the knowledge economy expands, the marketplace for
intellectual asset transactions will have to mature. In order to do so,
the participants in the market must have a better understanding of the
value of the assets involved in these transactions. Much of this
author’s ongoing research involves locating relevant information andIntellectual Asset Transactions 29
110. Although not covered in this article, quantitative metrics can also be quite useful
in determining the licensee’s acceptable range of royalty rates. See generally MARTHA
AMRAM &N ALIN KULATILAKA,R EAL OPTIONS (1999); Timothy A. Luehrman, Strategy
as a Portfolio of Real Options,H ARV.B US.R EV., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 89; CLARKSON &
APPLEGATE, supra note 12.
exploring robust metrics to process that information to achieve a
better understanding of the intellectual asset market. Using such
quantitative metrics, intellectual asset transactions can take place in a
more informed manner. Licensors can enter negotiations knowing
their industry’s average contribution to profit from intellectual assets
that are exploited internally. They can use this average as a starting
point for a royalty rate, with the range of CPIPIA across the industry
defining a reaonable range of royalty rates. Alternatively, CPIPIA
can be used as a “reality check” for license rates derived by other
means.
On the other side of the transaction, with an appropriate set of
metrics, the licensee could enter negotiations with a reasonable
estimate of the range of appropriate royalty rates.
110 The convergence
of these two ranges defines a set of win-win licensing scenarios. If
there are no win-win scenarios, the parties can then make an informed
decision whether to look elsewhere for licensing possibilities. Use of
metrics by both parties increases the likelihood that assets will be
used so as to maximize their value.Intellectual Asset Transactions 30
Company REV NI DFNI R_D RDSALES MKTCAP CPIA SIC
ABBOTT LABORATORIES 11,013.46 $ 1,882.03 $ 1,939.30 $ 1,204.84 $ 10.94% 39,303.29 $ 13.8% 2834
ACCREDO HEALTH INC 256.43 $3 . 1 3 $5 . 1 4 $- $ 0.00% 297.27 $1 . 8 % 2 8 3 4
AKORN INC 64.63 $6 . 6 7 $7 . 8 2 $2 . 7 4 $ 4.25% 90.92 $9 . 6 % 2 8 3 4
ALLERGAN INC 1,452.40 $1 8 8 . 2 0 $1 9 7 . 8 0 $1 6 8 . 4 0 $ 11.59% 6,458.50 $ 13.6% 2834
ALPHARMA INC -CL A 742.18 $3 9 . 5 5 $ 64.24 $ 40.17 $ 5.41% 910.60 $8 . 2 % 2 8 3 4
ALZA CORP 406.30 $9 2 . 4 0 $1 1 9 . 5 2 $ 26.80 $ 6.60% 2,189.02 $ 27.7% 2834
AMARIN CORP PLC -SPON ADR 11.21 $4 . 3 7 $5 . 5 1 $7 . 4 3 $ 66.28% 90.32 $ 49.3% 2834
AMBI INC 28.30 $5 . 8 6 $6 . 1 0 $1 . 7 9 $ 6.31% 73.51 $ 21.2% 2834
AMERISOURCE HEALTH CP -CL A 9,807.36 $6 7 . 4 7 $ 91.28 $- $ 0.00% 1,216.43 $0 . 8 % 5 1 2 2
ASTRAZENECA PLC -SPON ADR 17,950.00 $ 1,143.00 $ 1,231.80 $ 2,472.00 $ 13.77% 74,106.25 $6 . 8 % 2 8 3 4
BARR LABORATORIES INC 444.03 $4 9 . 2 5 $ 50.99 $ 22.59 $ 5.09% 909.39 $ 10.4% 2834
BAUSCH & LOMB INC 1,756.10 $4 4 4 . 8 0 $4 9 7 . 8 4 $ 97.60 $ 5.56% 3,926.70 $ 22.0% 2834
BERGEN BRUNSWIG CORP -CL A 21,245.54 $7 0 . 5 7 $1 1 7 . 9 8 $- $ 0.00% 1,392.39 $0 . 4 % 5 1 2 2
BINDLEY WESTERN INDS 8,507.61 $3 8 . 3 0 $ 52.36 $- $ 0.00% 512.12 $0 . 2 % 5 1 2 2
BIOVAIL CORP 151.79 $6 2 . 4 8 $ 67.97 $ 33.13 $ 21.83% 5,830.87 $ 44.6% 2834
BRADLEY PHARMACEUTICL -CL A 18.85 $0 . 5 6 $0 . 7 0 $- $ 0.00% 8.60 $3 . 4 % 2 8 3 4
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB 20,222.00 $ 4,167.00 $ 4,245.00 $ 1,843.00 $ 9.11% 127,143.98 $ 20.8% 2834
CARDINAL HEALTH INC 25,033.60 $4 5 6 . 3 0 $5 1 5 . 9 4 $ 49.70 $ 0.20% 17,563.84 $1 . 8 % 5 1 2 2
CATALYTICA INC 423.70 $2 7 . 1 3 $ 32.15 $- $ 0.00% 446.05 $7 . 2 % 2 8 3 4
CHATTEM INC 298.14 $2 0 . 1 6 $ 42.25 $1 . 8 4 $ 0.62% 187.46 $ 13.9% 2834
CHESAPEAKE BIOLOGICAL -CL A 10.78 $2 . 4 2 $2 . 7 8 $- $ 0.00% 24.84 $ 18.1% 2834
CHIRON CORP 683.33 $1 6 0 . 5 8 $1 7 4 . 9 1 $2 5 3 . 7 0 $ 37.13% 7,706.44 $ 25.6% 2834
COMPARE GENERIKS INC 41.31 $0 . 2 7 $0 . 2 7 $- $ 0.00% 3.10 $0 . 3 % 5 1 2 2
D&K HEALTHCARE RESOURCES INC 815.32 $6 . 3 6 $9 . 5 1 $- $ 0.00% 104.43 $1 . 0 % 5 1 2 2
DEXTER CORP 1,041.67 $1 0 7 . 5 0 $1 2 0 . 0 5 $ 49.71 $ 4.77% 915.88 $ 10.7% 2834
DURA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 301.43 $3 0 . 0 0 $ 40.91 $- $ 0.00% 583.12 $8 . 3 % 2 8 3 4
FOREST LABORATORIES -CL A 872.82 $1 1 2 . 6 9 $1 1 2 . 6 9 $ 70.29 $ 8.05% 7,153.85 $ 11.8% 2834
ICN PHARMACEUTICALS INC 747.41 $1 1 8 . 6 3 $1 5 2 . 1 9 $ 10.96 $ 1.47% 1,998.38 $ 15.3% 2834
INSITE VISION INC 4.76 $1 . 1 5 $1 . 1 5 $1 . 4 0 $ 29.35% 55.82 $ 21.4% 2834
IVAX CORP 656.27 $7 0 . 7 2 $ 74.06 $ 54.16 $ 8.25% 2,613.37 $ 10.0% 2834
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 27,471.00 $ 4,167.00 $ 4,333.80 $ 2,600.00 $ 9.46% 129,587.94 $ 15.7% 2834
JONES PHARMA INC 132.54 $4 8 . 9 4 $ 48.94 $1 . 3 4 $ 1.01% 1,886.82 $ 32.3% 2834
K V PHARMACEUTICAL -CL A 145.97 $2 4 . 3 1 $ 25.47 $8 . 0 4 $ 5.51% 505.20 $ 16.4% 2834
KING PHARMACEUTICALS INC 348.27 $4 4 . 9 5 $ 78.40 $2 . 0 3 $ 0.58% 2,702.52 $ 22.4% 2834
LABORATORIO CHILE -SPON ADR 176.61 $1 9 . 7 3 $ 24.82 $0 . 2 6 $ 0.15% 287.37 $ 13.9% 2834
LILLY (ELI) & CO 9,912.90 $ 2,721.00 $ 2,848.68 $ 1,783.60 $ 17.99% 72,500.83 $ 28.7% 2834
MANNATECH INC 179.73 $1 0 . 7 9 $ 10.88 $4 . 0 6 $ 2.26% 128.53 $5 . 2 % 2 8 3 4
MCKESSON HBOC INC 36,712.50 $7 2 3 . 7 0 $7 9 5 . 9 4 $1 1 2 . 6 0 $ 0.31% 5,950.41 $1 . 5 % 5 1 2 2
MEDICIS PHARMACEUT CP -CL A 116.87 $4 1 . 4 4 $ 42.53 $ 12.90 $ 11.03% 727.30 $ 22.3% 2834
MERCK & CO 32,714.00 $ 5,890.50 $ 6,080.64 $ 2,119.40 $ 6.48% 156,486.03 $ 18.6% 2834
MGI PHARMA INC 24.68 $4 . 7 3 $4 . 7 3 $6 . 6 8 $ 27.05% 178.83 $ 16.4% 2834
NATURES SUNSHINE PRODS INC 289.19 $1 7 . 8 0 $ 17.82 $1 . 6 6 $ 0.57% 137.02 $1 . 8 % 2 8 3 4
NBTY INC 630.89 $2 7 . 2 8 $ 38.65 $- $ 0.00% 503.98 $4 . 8 % 2 8 3 4
NOVARTIS AG -SPON ADR 21,643.33 $ 4,439.33 $ 4,702.13 $ 2,830.67 $ 13.08% 95,840.84 $ 21.7% 2834
NOVO-NORDISK A/S -ADR 2,958.58 $3 2 5 . 9 7 $3 4 4 . 1 4 $4 5 3 . 6 0 $ 15.33% 8,472.40 $ 10.9% 2834
PFIZER INC 16,204.00 $ 3,179.00 $ 3,320.60 $ 2,776.00 $ 17.13% 124,788.98 $ 20.0% 2834
POLYDEX PHARMACEUTICALS LTD 13.10 $0 . 9 7 $1 . 0 6 $0 . 6 8 $ 5.17% 15.20 $4 . 7 % 2 8 3 4
ROCHE HOLDINGS LTD -SP ADR 18,080.85 $ 3,607.16 $ 4,071.56 $ 2,365.77 $ 13.08% 83,141.23 $ 22.5% 2834
SEL-LEB MARKETING INC 21.43 $0 . 9 2 $1 . 1 1 $- $ 0.00% 7.35 $1 . 9 % 5 1 2 2
SICOR INC 229.00 $1 1 . 6 8 $ 14.90 $ 15.80 $ 6.90% 688.57 $6 . 4 % 2 8 3 4
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PLC -ADR 13,535.32 $ 1,700.59 $ 1,791.68 $ 1,644.07 $ 12.15% 72,027.76 $ 13.2% 2834
SYNCOR INTL CORP/DE 520.31 $1 9 . 2 2 $ 23.43 $- $ 0.00% 346.97 $3 . 3 % 5 1 2 2
TARO PHARMACEUTICAL INDS LTD 83.79 $5 . 5 4 $7 . 7 6 $ 11.73 $ 14.00% 156.56 $8 . 6 % 2 8 3 4
TEVA PHARM INDS -ADR 1,282.41 $1 1 7 . 8 3 $1 3 8 . 5 8 $ 99.54 $ 7.76% 4,481.50 $ 10.5% 2834
THERAGENICS CORP 43.72 $1 6 . 0 1 $ 16.07 $0 . 7 1 $ 1.62% 267.46 $ 17.9% 2834
UNITED GUARDIAN INC 9.14 $1 . 3 9 $1 . 3 9 $0 . 2 7 $ 2.92% 17.11 $5 . 5 % 2 8 3 4
USANA HEALTH SCIENCES INC 129.39 $5 . 9 0 $6 . 0 9 $1 . 3 8 $ 1.06% 50.84 $3 . 9 % 2 8 3 4
WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS INC 689.23 $1 7 8 . 8 8 $1 8 5 . 5 5 $ 49.27 $ 7.15% 3,442.72 $ 25.6% 2834
VI. APPENDIX